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In contrast, Mr. Newkirk presented a 
psychiatrist who testified that in the best 
interest of the children, they should be 
placed in the custody of their father. It was 
the psychiatrist's opinion that it was 
natural for the teenagers to prefer living 
with perek, who is closer to their age, 
than with a parent of a different genera-
tion. He also stated that the children felt 
bound to fulfill their mother's wish for 
Derek to take care of them. Newkirk, at 
595, 535 A.2d at 950. 
In awarding the children to Derek, 
Chancellor Levin considered the reports 
presented to the court and additionally in-
dicated that he feared the estranged rela-
tionship that developed between Mr. 
Newkirk and his adopted sons would 
repeat itself if the father was given the cus-
tody of J ames and Meghan. The chancellor 
also gave sufficient weight to the children's 
desires to live with Derek. Md. Fam. Law 
Code Ann. § 9-102 (1984) and Md. Est. & 
Trusts Code Ann. § 13-702 (1974) allow 
minors, who have attained the ages of 16 
and 14 respectively, to petition for or des-
ignate their prefered guardians. Newkirk at 
595, 535 A.2d at 950-51. 
Reviewing this decision, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland could not 
conclude that the chancellor was clearly er-
roneous in his findings nor that he abused 
his judicial discretion in giving Derek cus-
tody of the children. 
The Appellant next contended that the 
chancellor erred in admitting into evi-
dence evaluative reports by the Juvenile 
Services Administration and the circuit 
court's Mental Hygiene Consultation 
Service. Mr. Newkirk alleged that "the 
children never waived their respective 
privileges (of non-disclosure) nor were 
they advised of the existence thereof." Id. 
at 596, 535 A.2d at 951. The court, again, 
found no merit to this contention. 
Both reports were ordered by officers of 
the court to aid in evaluating the emo-
tional stability of the children, as well as 
the capacity of the two litigants to provide 
for James and Meghan. The court further 
indicated that the Appellant failed to raise 
this issue below and therefore, it had been 
waived under Md. Rule 1085. 
Richard Newkirk's final averment was 
that there was no basis in fact or in law for 
the judgment entered against him for 
retroactive child support and continued 
weekly support payments. Id. The court of 
special appeals held that by an order effec-
tive prior to Patricia Newkirk's death, 
Richard Newkirk had a continuing obliga-
tion to provide for the support of his 
children until modification of the order, 
and that the judgment for arrearages was 
proper. 
The decision handed down by the Court 
of Special Apeals of Maryland in Newkirk 
makes it clear that the presumption that a 
biological parent is always the best custodi-
an of a child can be rebutted. The courts 
must thoroughly evaluate each custody 
dispute situation if the best interests of 
children are to be served. This important 
evaluative process attempts to ensure that 
Maryland's minors have a person at home 
who has the capacity, as well as desire, to 
care for them. 
-Jonathan c. Levy 
Campbell v. Montgomery County Bd. of 
Educ.: FEMALE MINOR DOES NOT 
ASSUME RISK OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT WHEN IMPERMISSIBLY 
ENTERING BOYS' LOCKER ROOM 
In Campbell 'V. ltlontgomery County 
Board of Education, 73 Md. App. 54, 533 
A.2d 9 (1987), the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland recently held that a 
junior high school student did not assume 
the risk of sexual assault, as a matter of 
law, when she entered the boys' locker 
THE 
room. As a result, the court confirmed the 
importance that the fact-finder decide 
issues of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of the risk. 
On a late October day in 1983, Dawn 
Campbell was at her junior high school in 
Montgomery County, Maryland. That 
day, Dawn was excused from her physical 
education class because she had a broken 
fmger. While her physical education class 
was in session, Dawn wandered onto the 
athletic field. According to Dawn, she was 
ordered by the boys' physical education 
teacher, Steven Rubinstein (Rubinstein), 
back into the building because she was dis-
rupting his class. Rubinstein claimed that 
he told Dawn and a friend to find their 
own physical education class that was also 
on the field. Rubinstein said that he watch-
ed them begin walking toward their class 
and then returned to his own. 
Instead of joining her class, Dawn re-
entered the building and proceeded to the 
boys' locker room with Georgia, another 
student. Dawn entered the boys' locker 
room but evidently Georgia did not fol-
low. At trial, Dawn testified that she had 
been in the boys' locker room four other 
times in the preceding two months. Each 
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time, she did so without permission. 
As soon as Dawn entered the locker 
room, she heard someone coming. Believ-
ing it was a teacher, Dawn hid in an old 
shower area which she had discovered on 
a prior visit because she did not want to be 
found in the locker room. Matt Stoulberg, 
a student, however, had followed Dawn 
into the old shower area where they began 
kissing. When another student, Rudy 
Crutchfield, entered the shower area, 
Dawn and Matt stopped kissing. Rudy 
grabbed Dawn, pulled her onto his lap and 
began molesting her. About fifteen boys 
arrived while Dawn was screaming and 
trying to get away from Rudy. The group 
of boys grabbed her and "pulled off her 
sweat shirt and brassiere, and sexually 
molested her by groping and fondling her 
breasts and 'between ... her legs:" Ill. at 
58, 533 A.2d at 11. After a few minutes, a 
second group of students joined in the 
assault. Dawn testified that Clarence 
Turner, a part of the second group, said 
that he wanted to rape her. This statement 
was confirmed by two other students that 
were present. When Dawn screamed for 
help, several boys covered her mouth and 
one student hit her to make her remain 
quiet. The entire assault lasted for approxi-
mately thirty minutes, ending when the 
bell rang. 
When Rubinstein entered the boys' 
locker room shortly after the bell rang, he 
heard a noise from the old shower area. He 
yelled for whoever was in the area to get 
out. Three to five male students exited the 
restricted area and were reprimanded for 
being there. Rubinstein did not ask them 
why they had been in the old shower area. 
He listened for ten to fifteen seconds and 
yelled "there better not be anybody else," 
and listened again. Ill. at 59, 533 A.2d at 12. 
He testified that he was confident no one 
else was in the restricted area. Rubinstein 
decided not to enter the area because he 
would not have fit through the opening 
and was afraid of ripping his shirt. Rubins-
tein remained in the locker room for five 
or six more minutes, until the end of the 
period, and did not hear any noise from 
the old shower area. 
After the bell rang, Dawn gathered her 
clothes and left the locker room aided by 
two boys. When she returned to the gym, 
a substitute teacher, noticing her flustered 
appearance, inquired as to the reason. Dis--
satisfied with Dawn's answer, the teacher 
took her to the principal's office. Dawn 
then related the preceding events to the 
principal because she was suspended for 
entering the boys' locker room. 
Subsequendy, Dawn and her mother 
sued the Montgomery County Board of 
Education (the Board), Rubinstein, and 
several students, in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County. Before the case was 
submitted to the jury, the trial judge en-
tered judgment in favor of Clarence 
Turner. The jury returned verdicts in 
favor of Dawn against the Board, Rubins-
tein and a student; in favor of her mother 
against the Board and Rubinstein; and in 
favor of mother and daughter against a stu-
dent for punitive damages. Subsequently, 
the trial judge struck the verdicts against 
the Board and Rubinstein. The verdict 
against the student was allowed to stand. 
The first issue addressed by the court of 
special appeals was whether there was suf-
ficient evidence of the negligence of either 
Rubinstein or the Board to allow the case 
to go to a jury. At trial, Dr. Stephens, the 
Assistant Principal of Sligo Junior High 
School, testified about the standard of care 
Rubinstein was held accountable for as a 
public school teacher. She testified that 
teachers would be expected to at least 
glance at all areas of the locker room 
where students could be found after a gym 
class. Dr. Stephens agreed that gym teach-
ers were responsible for preventing male 
students from sexually assaulting female 
students. Ill. at 61, 533 A.2d at 13. 
Rubinstein confirmed that he knew of 
his duty to supervise students in all parts of 
the building during his duty hours. These 
duties were enumerated in the Policies and 
Regulation Handbook for Montgomery 
County Public Schools. Ill. at 61-62, 533 
A.2d at 13. 
To begin its analysis, the court of special 
appeals noted that Maryland is very strict 
about taking cases from the jury in negli-
gence actions. "The rule has been stated as 
requiring submission if there be any evi-
dence, however slight, legally sufficient as 
tending to prove negligence, and the 
weight and value of such evidence will be 
left to the jury." Ill. at 62-63, 533 A.2d at 
13-14 (quoting Fowler 'lI. Smith, 240 Md. 
240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 554 (1965». The 
court found that the jury could reasonably 
have found from the evidence that Rubin-
stein was negligent in performing his 
duties as an agent of the Board. Therefore, 
the issue should have been submitted to 
the jury. Ill. at 63, 533 A.2d at 14. 
Next, the court of special appeals 
addressed whether the trial judge was cor-
rect in granting a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of 
Rubinstein and the Board. Resolution of 
this issue was predicated on whether 
Dawn was, as a matter of law, contribu-
torily negligent and assumed the risk of a 
sexual assault. 
The question of whether a plaintiff is 
contributorily negligent or assumes a risk 
is one for the trier of fact. H either defense 
is proven, the plaintiff is barred from 
recovery. Ill. at 64, 533 A.2d at 14. 
Contributory negligence exists when the 
plaintiff fails to act in a way that is consis--
tent with his or her knowledge of the 
danger that could result from his or her 
conduct. A case cannot be taken from the 
jury on the grounds of contributory negli-
gence unless there is no possibility that a 
reasonable person would find contributo-
ry negligence existed. The court of special 
appeals found that a reasonable person 
could have found that in spite of Dawn's 
prior visits to the boys' locker room, 
Dawn did not anticipate the danger she 
encountered there in October, 1983. Id. at 
64-65, 533 A.2d at 14-15. 
According to Maryland law, a person 
assumes "the risk as a matter of law only 
when the undisputed facts permit but one 
reasonable determination." Ill. at 65, 533 
A.2d at 15 (quoting Hooper 'lI. Mougin, 263 
Md. 630, 635, 284 A.2d 236,239 (1971». In 
this case, the court decided that there was 
no reason for Dawn to expect to be sexual-
ly assaulted when she entered the boys' 
locker room. Ill. 
Since the court held that the trial judge 
improperly invaded the discretion of the 
jury when he granted the j.n.o.v., they 
vacated that judgment and remanded the 
case to the Circuit Court for a determina-
tion of whether the Md. Educ. Code Ann. 
S 4-105 (1985) limitation of $100,000 
applies to the judgment against the Board 
and Rubinstein. Campbell, 73 Md. App. 
54, 66, 533 A.2d 9, 15 (1987). 
The court also declared that the trial 
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tion by .entering a judgment in favor of 
one of the students. The general rules 
according to which the sufficiency of evi-
dence is tested on appeal are the same for 
a directed verdict as for a judgment n.o.v. 
Id. at 66-67, 533 A.2d at 15-16. 
Through its holding in Campbell, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
effectively restrained a trial judge's 
authority, while ensuring that a plaintiff is 
not simply subjected to the prejudices of 
the trial judge. The defenses of assumption 
of the risk and contributory negligence 
were preserved as viable options for plain-
tiffs. 
-Stephanie A. Babb 
A heart attack may start with pres-
sure, fullness, squeezing or 
pain in the middle of your chest. It 
can spread to your shoulderl:l, 
neck or arms. Dizziness, fainting, 
sweating and shortness of 
breath may even occur. If you 
experience any of these symp-
toms for more than two minutes, 
call for emergency medical 
help immediately. The longer you 
wait, the more you risk dying. 
Which can be very painful for 
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Cobey v. State: CHROMOSOME 
VARIANT ANALYSIS 
INADMISSmLE TO MATCH 
AllEGED RAPIST TO VICTIM'S 
ABORTED FETUS 
In a case of first impression, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland in Cobey v. 
State, 73 Md. App. 233, 533 A.2d 944 
(1987), has held that results acquired by a 
technique known as Chromosome Variant 
Analysis (C.V A.) cannot be used as evi-
dence to support the possibility that an 
alleged rapist fathered the victim's fetus. 
On the evening of September 4, 1985, a 
woman drove her 1985 blue Subaru auto-
mobile to Northwest Branch Park. After 
parking her car, she went for a walk on a 
trail. While she was walking, the woman 
heard someone coming from behind and 
stepped aside. A man grabbed her, threw 
her off the trail into the woods and 
threatened to kill her if she screamed. He 
forced her to have oral sex with him, raped 
her, and then had anal sex with her, all 
against her will. Afterwards, he took the 
keys to her car and drove off. 
On September 27,1985, Appellant, Ken-
neth S. Cobey was ordered by the police to 
pull over and stop at a traffic observation 
checkpoint on Kennedy Street in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Although Appellant 
. had a valid Maryland driver's license he 
failed to produce the registration. The 
police impounded the car and after issuing 
the appellant two traffic tickets they allow-
ed him to leave. Further investigation by a 
police auto theft unit revealed that the car 
appellant had been driving was the vic-
tim's 1985 blue Subaru which had been 
taken from Northwest Branch Park 23 
days earlier. On September 30, 1985, 
Appellant was arrested by Montgomery 
County Police. 
During the early part of October, 1985, 
the victim learned that she was pregnant 
and testified at trial in the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County that the only 
possible source of her pregnancy was the 
rape. On October 21, 1985, the victim pro-
cured an abortion and with her permis-
sion, the police took possession of the 
aborted fetus. The fetus and blood samples 
from the victim and Appellant were flo"'fn 
to Dr. Susan Olson, a cytogeneticist at the 
Oregon Health Sciences University. There 
she performed a technique known as 
Chormosome Variant Analysis (C.V.A.) 
to determine whether Appellant might be 
the man who fathered the fetus. 
Appellant was brought to trial in July of 
1986. Although this resulted in a mistrial, 
the judge had denied Appellant's motion 
to exclude Dr. Olson's testimony before 
the mistrial was declared. At Appellant's 
second trial, the judge once again declined 
to relitigate the issue and permitted Dr. 
Olson to testify concerning the results of 
the C.V.A. Co~ 73 Md. App. at 236,533 
A.2d at 946. 
In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 
364 (1978), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland adopted the holding of Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.c. Cir., 1923) 
which created the Frye.Reed test. The test 
requires that "before a scientific opinion 
will be received as evidence at trial, the 
basis of that opinion must be shown to be 
generally accepted as reliable within the 
expert's particular scientific field." Id. at 
237,533 A.2d at 946 (quoting Reed v. State, 
283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 
(1978». Appellant contended that C.V.A. 
had not been generally accepted as reliable 
in the relevant scientific community; 
therefore, the testimony derived from the 
results of C.V.A. were inadmissible. 
Under the Frye-Reed test, the proponent of 
a new scientific test bears the burden of 
producing evidence to establish the general 
acceptance of the technique. Id. at 238, 533 
A.2d at 946 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 
285 Md. 488, 497, 404 A.2d 269, 274 
(1979». At trial, the court held that the 
State had met its burden under the Frye-
Reed test and it was this determination that 
was at issue before the appellate court. 
In reviewing the trial court's admissibili-
ty of evidence established by C.VA., the 
court had to resolve two threshold issues: 
first, whether the court is bound to con-
sider only evidence in the record which 
was before the trial court, and second, 
what standard of review should be applied 
to the trial court's decision. Although the 
court in Reed, did not address the issue of 
whether appellate review should be 
limited to materials specifically set forth in 
the record, the court's holding indicated 
that available legal and scientific commen-
taries could be taken into consideration 
even if not part of the record. Id. at 238, 
533 A.2d at 947. 
In Cobey, the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland also concluded that the stand-
ard of review applicable to the trial court's 
finding of general acceptance is whether 
the finding was against the weight of the 
evidence as opposed to whether it was 
clearly erroneous. The court based its con-
clusion on the fact that the court of appeals 
in Reed conducted its own examination of 
the evidence and concluded that spectro-
graphy was not generally accepted as relia-
ble, seeming to place no weight on the trial 
court's contrary finding. Id. at 239, 533 
A.2d at 947. 
At trial, the judge held a hearing out of 
the jury's presence to determine whether 
Dr. Olson would be allowed to testify 
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